Volume 35

Issue 3

Article 3

1990

Friends of Governor Kean v. New Jersey Election Law
Enforcement Commission: Re-Examining the Significant
Governmental Interests Furthered by Expenditure Limits in the
Post-Buckley Electoral Environment
John P. Monaghan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
John P. Monaghan, Friends of Governor Kean v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission: ReExamining the Significant Governmental Interests Furthered by Expenditure Limits in the Post-Buckley
Electoral Environment, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 611 (1990).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss3/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Monaghan: Friends of Governor Kean v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement C

1990]

Notes
FRIENDS OF GOVERNOR KEAN v. NEW JERSEY ELECTION LA W
ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION: RE-EXAMINING THE
SIGNIFICANT GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS FURTHERED BY
EXPENDITURE LIMITS IN THE POST-BUCKLEY ELECTORAL
ENVIRONMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1970s attempts were made to reform an electoral
process which was increasingly dominated by party power brokers and
large campaign contributors.I Arguably, such domination subverted the
democratic processes upon which the nation had been founded. Those
advocating reform sought an electoral process more responsive to, and
dependent upon, the desires and contributions of the electorate-atlarge. 2 These advocates of campaign finance reform were aided by the
revelations of unlawful financing methods employed in the Nixon campaign during the Watergate scandal in 1973-74. 3 Such shocking practices spurred Congress and many state legislatures to enact regulations
designed to curb the spiraling costs of financing campaigns and to re4
duce the potential for abuse and corruption in the electoral process.
These reforms often included five basic components. First, legislatures enacted statutes providing for public financing of certain campaigns, thereby capping election costs and eliminating the potentially
corrupting influence of large donors. 5 Second, limits were placed both
upon the amount any individual or Political Action Committee (PAC)
1. See N. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM 3-7 (1983). Polsby argues that the reform movement attempted to alter not only the manner in which
elections were financed, but also the process by which party nominees were selected; both branches of reform, however, had the same ultimate purpose-to
democratize the electoral process. Id. For another perspective describing how
party nomination and campaign finance reforms have served to increase participation in the presidential election process, see R. WATSON & N. THOMAS, THE
POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENCY 23-33 (1983).
2. See N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 3-7.
3. Id. at 36-37. The financing practices of the 1972 Nixon campaign in-

cluded both the virtual extortion of monies from potential contributors and the
acceptance of illegal donations. Ewing, The Legal Regulation of Campaign Financing
in American Federal Elections, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 370, 388 (1988).
4. N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 37. Polsby notes, however, that the Watergate

scandal not only involved financing irregularities, but also far broader governmental concerns. Id. For a discussion of state legislative reforms enacted after
Watergate, see F. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 336-37 (5th ed. 1984).
5. See N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 37-38; see also F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at

334.

(611)
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could contribute to a particular candidate and also upon the total
amount an individual could donate to all campaigns, parties or PACs per
year. 6 Third, limits were placed on the amount an individual or PAC
could spend independent of official campaigns on behalf of particular
candidates. 7 Fourth, reformers mandated disclosure by candidates of all
campaign contributions above a certain amount.8 Finally, maximum
limits were set for total campaign expenditures by individual candidates. 9
Courts, however, rejected many of these legislative devices.' 0 The
United States Supreme Court has invalidated many of the aforementioned reforms as violative of constitutional guarantees of free speech
and association." This rejection has frustrated the legislative purpose
of reducing the potential for abuse and corruption in the electoral process. Instead, judicial decisions have assisted the development of an
electoral process which continues to grow increasingly fragmented, expensive and vulnerable to corruption.12
Given the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of certain
campaign finance reforms as unconstitutional, the New Jersey Supreme
Court had to decide in Friends of Governor Kean v. New Jersey Election Law
Enforcement Commission 13 whether the state election commission could allocate the independent expenditures of a legislative candidate on behalf4
of Governor Kean as an expense of the Governor's official campaign.'
The state legislature had delegated to the election commission the
power to enforce campaign expenditure limits in the publicly financed
6. N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 39; see also F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 332.
7. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 389. Ewing explains that in federal finance
reform legislation individuals, including PACs, were limited to $1000 in independent spending. Id. at 388 & n.89, 389.
8. See N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 39; see also F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 334;
Ewing, supra note 3, at 389-90.
9. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 389; see also N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 39; F.
SORAUF, supra note 4, at 332-33.
10. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (limitation of independent expenditures by
PACs on behalf of favored candidates violates first amendment free speech guarantee); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (contributory limits to
candidates permissible to protect substantial state interest in maintaining electoral integrity, but limitation of expenditures by candidates or individuals acting
independently violates first amendment guarantees).
11. See National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 497-502; Buckley, 424 U.S. at
55-59.
12. For an examination of the detrimental effects on the electoral process
due to judicial frustration of campaign finance reform, see infra notes 61-69, 81

& 122-55 and accompanying text.
13. 144 N.J. 33, 552 A.2d 612 (1989) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 36-37, 552 A.2d at 613-14. In 1981, the NewJersey Election Law
Enforcement Commission (NJELEC) issued an advisory opinion which stated
that such presumed allocative power would be used; by 1985, however, it had
not promulgated an official regulation to that effect. Id. at 39, 552 A.2d at 615.
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gubernatorial race. 15 The court held that the commission's allocation of
expenditures to Kean's campaign would exceed its legislatively granted
authority where such spending was truly independent of Kean's own
campaign. 16 Moreover, the court stated that even if the legislature had
granted the commission authority to allocate independent spending,
such authority would likely violate the constitutional guarantee of free
speech by unduly limiting the amount a legislative candidate may independently spend on behalf of another.17
This Note will discuss legislative attempts at campaign finance reform and describe their goals and purposes.' 8 This Note will also examine judicial reaction to those legislative reforms. 19 Further, an
examination of the Friends of Kean decision will show it to be consistent
with prior United States Supreme Court decisions involving campaign
finance legislation. 2 0 Finally, this Note will attempt to extrapolate the
impact of Friends of Kean and other decisions involving campaign finance
2
regulation on the current and future electoral processes. '
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Federal Campaign Finance Reform-Legislative Enactments

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 197122 allowed public financing of presidential elections in response to spiraling presidential
election costs. 2 3 In 1972, however, the regulations implementing public
financing had not yet been adopted and, as a result, the election between Richard Nixon and George McGovern remained privately financed at a cost of $103 million (excluding the expenditures of those
15. For a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusions regarding the legislature's purposes in creating NJELEC to oversee the financing
of the gubernatorial election, see infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
16. Friends of Kean, 114 N.J. at 37-39, 552 A.2d at 614-15. However, if
spending was not truly independent, but rather was expended in coordination
with a gubernatorial campaign, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that
NJELEC would have the authority to allocate such spending to the gubernatorial
campaign. Id.
17. Id. at 39-40, 552 A.2d at 615. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that the rationales of the Buckley and National Conservative PAC decisions were
applicable in the case at bar. Id. at 40, 552 A.2d at 615.
18. For an examination of the methods, goals and purposes in legislative
attempts at campaign finance reform, see infra notes 22-36 and accompanying
text.
19. For an analysis of the judicial reaction to federal congressional finance
legislation, see infra notes 37-81 and accompanying text.
20. For a detailed discussion of the NewJersey Supreme Court's decision in
Friends of Kean, see infra notes 90-120 and accompanying text.
21. For a description of the effects which the judicial decisions have
wrought on the electoral process, see infra notes 122-55 and accompanying text.
22. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
23. N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 36-39.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 3
614

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: p. 611

who sought party nominations). 24 To finance expensive, media-dominated campaigns, Nixon and McGovern needed to attract large donors.
For example, Clement Stone contributed over two million dollars to
Nixon's campaign, while Stewart Mott gave over one million dollars to
McGovern's losing effort. 2 5 Despite such escalating costs and potentially corrupting contributions during the 1972 campaign, the primary
catalyst for campaign finance reform did not occur until numerous criminal financing tactics employed by the Nixon campaign were revealed
26
during the Watergate scandal.
27
The 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act
were Congress's response to the corruption and abuse of power uncovered by the Watergate investigation. 28 The underlying purposes of the
amendments were: .(1) to prevent the potential for corruption by large
donors exerting undue influence on the electoral process and elected
officeholders; (2) to limit the escalating costs of all federal election campaigns; and (3) to implement the administrative framework necessary for
public financing of future presidential elections. 29 To accomplish these
ends, Congress enacted six major provisions to reform the process of
campaign financing.
First, the amendments limited to $1000 the amount an individual
could contribute to a particular candidate and limited to $25,000 the
total amount an individual could contribute to all candidates, PACs or
parties per year. 30 Second, the amendments limited to $5000 the
amount a PAC could contribute to a particular candidate. 3 1 Unlike indi24. See W. CROTrY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 117 (2d ed. 1984). The
$103 million figure also does not include expenditures made by parties on their
nominee's behalf or the costs of nominating conventions or other sources of
expenditures, which totaled $425 million in 1972 alone. Id. at 118; see also F.
SORAUF, supra note 4, at 318.
25. F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 332. Stewart Mott also donated a similar
amount to the losing 1968 McCarthy nomination campaign. Id. Thus, large
contributions were integral components of campaign financing for candidates of
both parties. See id.
26. For a discussion of the Watergate scandal as the primary impetus for
reform, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
27. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
28. Ewing, supra note 3, at 388; see also N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 36-39.
29. See

SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION,

FEDERAL ELECTION

1974, S.REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5587.

CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF

reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
30. Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). Section 101(b)(1) provided that "no person
shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1000." Id. Section 101(b)(3) provided that "[n]o individual shall make contributions aggregating more than
$25,000 in any calendar year." Id.
31. Id. Section 101(b)(2) provided that "[n]o political committee (other
than a principal campaign committee) shall make contributions to any candidate
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viduals, however, PACs were not limited in the total amount they could
contribute to all candidates per year. 3 2 Third, the amendments capped
the amount an individual or PAC could spend independently on behalf
of favored candidates to $1000.A3 Fourth, the amendments mandated
that all federal candidates disclose those donors who had contributed in
excess of $100 to the campaign, and their respective amounts. 34 Fifth,
the amendments limited federal candidates' total campaign expenditures to specific amounts. 35 Finally, the amendments created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) which implemented the rules necessary
36
for public financing of future presidential elections.
B. Judicial Reaction to Campaign Finance Reform Legislation
1. Buckley v. Valeo
Before such federal reforms could take full effect and attain their
stated purposes, they were challenged by numerous critics representing
a wide range of political ideologies. 3 7 All of the critics (who included a
presidential candidate, an incumbent United States Senator, a PAC, various state parties and the New York Civil Liberties Union) sought to
maintain unrestricted financing or to keep governmental interference to
a minimum. 38 These critics of reform legislation argued that legislatively imposed restrictions on campaign contributions were violative of
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and association. 39 Similar
with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed
$5,000." Id.
32. Id. A total contributory limit on PACs is often proposed as a potential
reform measure to curb current PAC dominance of the electoral financing process. See also Ewing, supra note 3, at 402.
33. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1974). Section 101(e)(l) provided that "[n]o
person may make any expenditure (other than an expenditure made by or on
behalf of a candidate . . .) relative to a clearly identified candidate . . . which,
when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000." Id.

34. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 389-90.
35. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1264 (1974). Section 101(c)(1)(A)-(E) sets maximum
spending limits in all general and primary elections for President, Senator and
Representative. Id.
36. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, § 310, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280 (1974); see also N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 37-39.
37. See N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 38-39.

38. F. SoRAUF, supra note 4, at 333 (notable among reform challenges were
Conservative (Party) Senator James Buckley, liberal ex-Senator Eugene McCarthy and the New York Civil Liberties Union); see also Ewing, supra note 3, at 39192. Ewing explains that the arguments propounded by the critics of the reform
measures were not accepted by the court of appeals which had validated the
congressional enactments. Id.
39. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1976) (per curiam). The first
amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
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arguments were developed with regard to regulations which set the
maximum amount candidates or individuals could spend during a campaign. 40 The United States Supreme Court, by agreeing in part with
these objections, dramatically altered the effect of campaign finance re4
form on the electoral process. '
In Buckley v. Valeo,42 the Court accepted some of the enacted re-

forms as a permissible use of legislative authority, yet objected to many
of the amendment's critical provisions because they infringed upon the
rights of free speech and association. 43 Specifically, the Court held it
permissible for Congress to limit the maximum amount an individual
could donate to a particular candidate and also the total amount the
individual could contribute per year. 4 4 The Buckley decision recognized
that these regulations served the important state interest of protecting
the electoral process from corruption and the undue influence of large
contributors over elected officials whom they supported. 45 Moreover,
the Court deemed a regulation of contributions to be a minimal infringement on individual freedoms of speech and association. 46 The
dom of speech.., or the right of the people peaceably to assemble .... U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
40. See F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 333; see also Ewing, supra note 3, at 392.
41. See N. POLSBY, supra note 1, at 36-39.
42. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).

43. Id. at 43-44.
44. Id. at 35, 38.
45. Id. at 26-27. Recognizing the important state interests which contributory limits served, the Court stated:

It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-to
limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions-in order to find a constitutionally
sufficient justification for the $1000 contiibution limitation. Under a
system of private financing of elections, a [non-wealthy] candidate...
must depend on financial contributions from others . . .to conduct a
successful campaign .... To the extent that large contributions are

given to secure political quidpro quo's from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never
be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after

the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.
Id.
For an additional judicial recognition of the governmental interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in the electoral process,
see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 & n.26 (1978).
46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29. The Court, noting that such limitations do
not exclude other methods of political participation by individuals in the campaigns of candidates whom they support, explained:
The Act's $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the
problem of large campaign contributions-the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have
been identified-while leaving persons free to engage in independent
political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their
services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in
supporting candidates and committees with financial resources. Signifi-
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Court similarly upheld regulations mandating the reporting of campaign
contributions, again citing the governmental interest in freeing the electoral system from corruption and the minimal infringement on free
47
speech and association.
Although the Court accepted the validity of regulations limiting an
individual's contributions, it invalidated reform provisions aimed at
curbing expenditures by candidates or individuals wholly independent
of official campaigns. 4 8 The Court found that a candidate had a constitutional right to spend any amount of money in his attempt to get
elected, be it his own or that which was donated to his campaign by
others. 49 The Buckley Court viewed any limits on candidate spending as
a severe restraint on both the quality and the quantity of a candidate's
right to freedom of speech, and it found that no legitimate governmental interest existed to justify such a restriction. 50 The Court stated that
cantly, the Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective
discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.
... [T]he weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial

contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited
effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.
Id. (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 66-68. The Court did note, however, that such provisions would
not be applicable for minor parties who could show that disclosures under the
Act would subject their donors to recriminations from the government or private parties. Id. at 68-72.
48. Id. at 58-59.
49. Id. at 54-58.
50. Id. at 55-57. The Court, expressly distinguishing between regulating
contributions, which served a substantial governmental interest, and regulating

expenditures, which could not be similarly justified, stated:
No governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to
justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression imposed by
...
campaign expenditure limitations. The major evil associated with
rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is the danger of candidate
dependence on large contributions. The interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by the Act's contribution limitations and disclosure provisions ....
The interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates
competing for federal office is no more convincing a justification for
restricting the scope of federal election campaigns ....
There is nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be
spent to carry the candidate's message to the electorate. Moreover, the
equalization of permissible campaign expenditures might serve not to
equalize the opportunities of all candidates but to handicap a candidate
who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views
before the start of the campaign.
...In any event, the mere growth in the cost of federal election
campaigns in and of itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign spending and the resulting limitation
on the scope of federal campaigns. The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one's polit-
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the governmental interest served by campaign expenditure ceilings was
the reduction of political campaign costs. 5 ' Such an interest, however,
provided no basis for the restrictions because, according to the Court,
the government is not permitted either to define the scope of campaigns
or delimit their expenditure levels. 5 2 The Court stated that the first
amendment "denies government the power to determine that spending
to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive or unwise."' 53 The
Court concluded that the limitation on individual and PAC contributions would adequately safeguard electoral integrity; therefore, further
restrictions on expenditures were unnecessary and would not justify an
54
invasion of free speech interests.
The Buckley decision also invalidated provisions restricting independent spending by individuals on behalf of candidates as violative
of first amendment guarantees. 5 5 The Court found that the governmental interest in preventing corruption, or the appearance thereof, did not
justify restrictions on independent spending. 56 Rejecting the argument
that independent spending could circumvent the interests served by the
individual contribution limits already upheld, the Court found that truly
independent spending would be of limited assistance to a candidate's
campaign. 5 7 Thus, unlike unregulated contributions, independent exical views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained
by our Constitution it is not the government but the people-individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political committees-who must retain control over the quantity and range
of debate on public issues in a political campaign.
Id. (citations omitted).

51. Id. at 57.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The Court noted, however, that if public funds were accepted for a
campaign, expenditure limits would be valid as a right freely relinquished by
candidates in exchange for a share of public money. Id. at 57 n.65.
55. Id. at 51.
56. Id. at 45.
57. Id. at 46-48. The Court, attempting to minimize the threat posed by
unlimited independent expenditures on the integrity of the electoral process,
claimed:
[T]he independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions .... [U]nlike
contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . .undermines the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate ....
While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process, it heavily burdens core First
Amendment expression .... Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First
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penditures did not present the potential for improper quid pro quos by
benefited candidates. 58 Contributions in the guise of "independent"
spending, however, were still subject to the contributory limits and the
penalties included for any violations of those limits. 5 9 In addition to
finding that no substantial governmental interest was adequately served,
the Court also noted that a limit on independent expenditures would
burden first amendment expression more directly than contributory
60
limitations.
The Buckley decision's detrimental effects on the electoral process
were immediately discernible. 61 The decision invalidated expenditure
limits for all campaigns, except those publicly financed; thus, campaign
costs continued to spiral without any restraint. 62 As the Court permitted, numerous candidates have spent millions from personal resources
to finance their own election campaigns, while others have been assisted
by independent outside supporters who spent on behalf of particularly
63
favored, or disfavored, candidates.
Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation.
...[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....
Id. at 46-49 (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 46-47.
59. Id. While invalidating the broad limitation on independent expenditures, the decision implied that a more specific restriction designed to prevent
the circumvention of the contributory limits through supposed "independent"
spending would pass constitutional muster. Id.
60. See id. at 47-48.
61. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 394-96. Ewing asserts that after the Buckley
decision campaign costs escalated and the influence of special interest PACs increased. Id. Ewing shows that, on average, a House of Representatives campaign cost $50,000 in 1974, $150,000 in 1980 and increased another 48% in
1982. Id. at 394. Moreover, PAC donations amounted to 26% of all monies
raised by successful congressional candidates in 1976, 28% in 1978 and 35% by
1982. Id. at 396.
62. See W. CROTrY, supra note 24, at 118. Crotty details the rising growth of
expenditures in all elections after the Supreme Court invalidated important legislative reforms: from $140 million in 1952, to $200 million in 1964, to $425
million in 1972 (just prior to the major reform enactments), to $500 million in
1976, and exploding to $1.2 billion in 1980. Id.
States that had adopted expenditure limits for all campaigns (such as New
Jersey) found such restrictions nullified, except in those elections for which public financing had been adopted. See Common Cause v. New Jersey Election Law
Enforcement Comm'n, 155 N.J. Super. 241, 382 A.2d 681 (App. Div. 1978).
63. See W. CROTrY, supra note 24, at 123-32. Crotty notes that SenatorJohn
Heinz (Republican, Pennsylvania) lent his 1976 senatorial campaign $2.6 million
from personal assets, won the election and joined a United States Senate that
was comprised, in part, of 40 other millionaires. Id. at 124.
Crotty also notes the increasing amount of independent spending which began to proliferate in the electoral process after the Buckley decision. Id. at 12627, 129-32. A single PAC, the National Congressional Club, spent $7.8 million
independently in 1980 to support Ronald Reagan and "New Right" senatorial
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The Buckley decision's most important effect, however, is its widening of PAC influence within the electoral process. 64 Since Buckley, PACs
have become the primary source of contributions to campaigns. 6 5 Candidates, in need of large sums of money to meet escalating campaign
costs, look first to PACs rather than to individual contributors. 66 It is far
easier for candidates to find PACs sympathetic to their ideological
causes, or those simply seeking political leverage, who are willing to donate. 6 7 Moreover, because campaign finance reform did not place a total contributory limit on PACs as had been placed on individuals, PACs
are permitted to donate to a greater number of candidates. 6 8 Thus,
although reforms attempted to give individuals more influence in the
financing process, such influence was usurped by PACs in the aftermath
candidates. Id. at 126-28. In 1982, the National Conservative Political Action
Committee, another ideological PAC, spent $3.2 million on behalf of "New
Right" congressional candidates and/or against liberal incumbents. Id. at 129-

31; see also F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 322-23 (independent spending in 1980
presidential election totaled $13.4 million, $12 million of which was expended
on behalf of Ronald Reagan).
64. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 395 (PACs' numbers rose from 1146 in 1976
to 4567 in 1987, 11 years after Buckley).
65. Id. at 396 ("[I]n 1986 ... it was estimated that nearly half the Representatives got 50% or more of their money from PACs."). But see W. CROTrY,
supra note 24, at 134 ("The chief source of funds remains individual contributions, although these have been in a steady decline since 1974, falling from
about three-fourths of the total to something over one-half by 1980.").
66. See W. CROTrY, supra note 24, at 133. Crotty believes that the relative
ease in which candidates can finance their campaigns through willing PACs make
them far more attractive than soliciting individual donors, stating:
It is much easier for a candidate to court one of a series of wealthy
PACs to acquire the money he or she needs to run an effective race. As
the costs of campaigns continue to escalate, there is an attractiveness
and economy to fund raising through direct appeals to sympathetic
PACs. The PACs, in effect, help minimize one of the most time-consuming and unpleasant aspects of campaigning, raising the money necessary to run for elective office.
Id.
67. Id. Though PACs may ease the burdens on candidates in financing
their campaigns, incumbent candidates who depend on PACs may become insulated from the constituents whom they are supposed to represent. See id. For a
description of the increasingly symbiotic relationship between PACs and incumbent officeholders in the 1984 elections, see Jacob, The CongressionalElections, in
THE ELECTION OF 1984 118-19 (M. Pomper ed. 1985).
68. W. CROTrY, supra note 24, at 133. Crotty points out that the legislation
created an inherent incentive for candidates to finance their campaigns through
PAC donations rather than seeking individual contributions, noting:
Another factor funneling money through the PACs into elections
has been the $1,000 limit on individual contributions to federal candidates. An individual is allowed to give $5,000 to a multicandidate political committee (such as a PAC), and it appears that many wealthy
donors prefer to take this route.... Whether it cuts down on the political access of the wealthy and their impact on the political system is less
likely.
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of the Buckley decision.

2.

Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee

The number of PACs contributing to campaigns exploded in Buckley's wake, inexorably changing the political environment. 70 Due to the
PACs' expanding number and growing influence as a result of candidate
dependence, the Supreme Court had to decide a number of cases after
Buckley which served to define the relationship of PACs to the electoral
process. 7 1 Because PACs were relative newcomers to the electoral envi69. For a discussion of the increasing number of PACs and their growing
dominance of the campaign finance process, see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 122-23 & 139-44 and accompanying text.
70. For a discussion of the tremendous numerical growth of PACs in the
wake of the United States Supreme Court decisions frustrating the purposes of
campaign finance reform, see Ewing, supra note 3, at 395 (noting number of
PACs increased from 1146 in 1976 to 4567 in 1987).
71. For example, in California Medical Association v. Federal Election
Commission, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), the PAC of the California Medical Association challenged a requirement of the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act which limited individual contributions to a PAC to $5000 per person per year. Id. at 195. The amendments also subjected PACs to criminal penalties if the PAC knowingly accepted donations which exceeded an individual's
limit. Id. at 185. The Court held that limits on individual contributions to PACs
did not violate the first amendment speech and association guarantees. Id. at
197-99. Writing for a plurality, Justice Marshall stated:
If the First Amendment rights of a contributor are not infringed by limitations in the amount he may contribute to a campaign organization
which advocates the views and candidacy of a particular candidate, the
rights of a contributor are similarly not impaired by limits in the
amount he may give to a multicandidate political committee, such as
CALPAC, which advocates the views and candidacies of a number of
candidates.
Id. at 197.
The Court found that the limit served the substantial governmental interest
of maintaining the integrity of the electoral process by keeping it free of corruption, or the appearance thereof, so as to justify the minimal infringement upon
individual rights exerted by the regulations. Id. at 197-99. Justice Marshall
wrote:
We also disagree ...

that the contribution restriction ... does not

further the governmental interest in preventing the actual or apparent
corruption of the political process. Congress enacted [the statutory restriction] to prevent circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this Court upheld in Buckley ....

If ...

Congress cannot

prohibit individual and unincorporated associations from making unlimited contributions to multicandidate political committees .
both these contribution limitations could be easily evaded ....

.

. then
[Aln

individual or association seeking to evade the $1000 limit on contributions to candidates could do so by channelling funds through a multicandidate political committee. Similarly, individuals could evade the
$25,000 limit on aggregate annual contributions to candidates if they
were allowed to give unlimited sums to multicandidate political committees, since such committees are not limited in the aggregate amount
they may contribute in any year.
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ronment, the Court's decisions further clarified the constitutional limitations on legislative regulation of PAC contributions and expenditures. 7 2
In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 73 the Court again rejected regulations limiting the independent expenditures of PACs on behalf of supported candidates. 74 The National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), along with
other ideologically conservative PACs, had announced its intention, well
prior to the presidential election of 1984, to further the reelection effort
of President Ronald Reagan by independently spending large amounts
on his behalf.7 5 Such independent spending by the PACs would have

Id. at 197-98 (footnotes omitted).
Justice Marshall also noted that individuals were still free to independently
spend unlimited sums to further the candidacies of whomever they desired to
support. Id. at 195. Thus, the contributory limits on PACs did not violate first
amendment prerogatives.
Similarly, the Court in Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee, limited individual contributions to PACs by strictly delimiting those
individuals from whom a corporate PAC could solicit contributions. 459 U.S.
197, 209-10 (1982). The committee challenged a provision in the 1971 Federal

Campaign Act which stated that a non-profit corporate PAC without capital
stock could only solicit corporate stockholders and personnel for contributions.
Id. at 204-06. The PAC claimed the statute violated the guarantee of freedom of
association expounded in the first amendment and argued that the regulation be
interpreted "elastically" to avoid impermissible interference with the constitu-

tional right of association. Id. at 206-07.
In upholding the regulation, the Court stated that the restriction narrowly
protected not only the governmental interest in preserving electoral integrity,

but also the interests of potential donors to the PAC who might be unaware of
the true purposes to which their contributions would be put. Id. at 207-08.
Writing for the majority, Justice (presently Chief Justice) Rehnquist explained:
The first purpose . . . is to ensure that substantial aggregations of
wealth amassed by ... the corporate form ...should not be converted
into political "war chests" which could be used to incur political debts
from legislators who are aided by the contributions. The second purpose of the provisions . . . is to protect the individuals who have paid
money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support
of candidates from having the money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.
We agree... that these purposes are sufficient to justify the regulation .... [We note] the importance of preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of
corruption ....
We are . . . convinced that the statutory prohibitions and exceptions ... considered are sufficiently tailored to these purposes to avoid
undue restriction on the associational interest asserted ....
Id. (citation omitted).
72. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 387-88 (1971 Federal Election Campaign Act
first legitimized role for PACs in electoral process).
73. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
74. Id. at 500-01.
75. Id. at 483. PAC independent spending played a significant role in President Reagan's successful 1980 election campaign; Reagan benefitted from $12
million in independent expenditures on his behalf in 1980, well over 90% of the
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been in direct violation of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act,
which expressly limited the independent spending of PACs on behalf of
any particular candidate to $1000.76

The Court found that the regulation limiting PAC independent expenditures violated the first amendment. 77 In so doing, the majority
noted that Buckley recognized a parallel right of individuals to spend independently, without limit, on behalf of favored candidates as part of
the free speech guarantee. 78 The Court rejected the FEC argument that
the absence of limits on PAC independent spending served as a corruptive influence upon the electoral process by minimizing the potential
detrimental effects such independent spending might have on electoral
integrity. 79 The Court stated that such an inconsequential threat to the
total amount of independent spending in the presidential election of that year.
See F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 322-23. The "independent" nature of such
spending on Reagan's behalf was unsuccessfully challenged by the FEC, Common Cause and the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, who claimed that
many independent spenders had close associations with earlier Reagan presidential efforts. See R. WATSON & N. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 87.
The spending, though on Reagan's behalf, was not made at the request of
or in coordination with the official Reagan campaign. National Conservative PAC,
470 U.S. at 490. Any coordination with the Reagan campaign concerning such
spending by NCPAC would subject the committee to the contributory limits validated in Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curium).
76. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 491. The Court quoted the specific provisions of the Act as follows:
(1)

.

.

. it shall be unlawful for any political committee which is

not an authorized committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a
political party for President and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign
expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in
an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000.
Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 9012() (1982)).
77. Id. at 501.
78. Id. at 494-96. Recounting the holding of Buckley, Justice Rehnquist
elaborated:
We held in Buckley . . . that preventing corruption or the appear-

ance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government
interests ... identified for restricting campaign finances. In Buckley, we

struck down the FECA's limitation on individuals' independent expenditures because we found no tendency in such expenditures, uncoordinated with the candidate or his campaign, to corrupt or to give the
appearance of corruption. For similar reasons, we also find .

.

. [the]

limitation on independent expenditures by political committees to be
constitutionally infirm.
Id. at 496-97.
79. Id. at 497-98. Rejecting the FEC argument that the restriction furthered the government's interest in electoral integrity, Justice Rehnquist
continued:

It is contended that, because the PACs may by the breadth of their organizations spend larger amounts than the individuals in Buckley, the
potential for corruption is greater. But precisely what the "corruption"
may consist of we are never told with assurance. The fact that candi-
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electoral process could not justify the infringement on free speech which
a limitation of independent expenditures would impose on PACs and
their contributors80
The National Conservative PAC decision fortified the enormous influence of PACs on the electoral process by permitting an unrestricted use
of their growing resources. A PAC, though limited to $5000 in donations to a particular candidate, could spend any amount it desired independently for that candidate, even if the candidate had accepted public
financing. 8 '
C.

Campaign Reform Law at the State Level

1. New Jersey Campaign Reform Law
The federal government was not alone in enacting campaign reform
legislation. By 1974, many states, including NewJersey, had already enacted some variant of campaign finance reform law. 8 2 Approximately
one-half of the state legislatures have now adopted contributory restrictions for state campaigns. 8 3 Moreover, after the revelations of Watergate, thirty states attempted to limit expenditures in state campaigns;
84
after the Buckley decision, however, such statutes were invalidated.
NewJersey's attempt at campaign reform is illustrative of such state
attempts. In 1973, New Jersey adopted the Campaign Contributions
and Expenditures Reporting Act (CCERA). 85 As originally adopted,
dates and elected officials may alter or reaffirm their own positions on
issues in response to political messages paid for by the PACs can hardly
be called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is
the presentation to the electorate of varying points of view.
Id.
80. Id. Downplaying the potential threat which uncurbed independent
spending may engender, Justice Rehnquist concluded that whatever risk to electoral integrity existed was much too speculative to warrant the infringement
upon individual free speech and association, explaining:
It is of course hypothetically possible here, as in the case of the independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candidates may take
notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving
official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages.
But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and
thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. On this record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more.
Id. at 498.
81. For a discussion of the holding and rationale in National Conservative
PAC, see supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
82. See F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 336-37.
83. Id. All but North Dakota mandated disclosure of campaign donations
and spending. Id. at 336.
84. Id.
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A (West 1989).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss3/3

14

Monaghan: Friends of Governor Kean v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement C
1990]

NOTE

625

CCERA required the reporting of all campaign expenditures and contributors and set maximum limits upon expenditures by candidates in all
state campaigns. 8 6 During the following year additional reforms were
implemented, including a public financing scheme for the gubernatorial
87
election.
The Buckley decision, which nullified much of the federal reform enactments, had similar implications for state legislation. In response to
Buckley, the New Jersey legislature amended the CCERA to impose expenditure limits only on those gubernatorial candidates who had accepted money under the state's public financing scheme. 8 8 Such
gubernatorial expenditure limits were at issue in Friends of Governor Kean
v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission.89
2.

Friends of Governor Kean v. New Jersey Election Law
Enforcement Commission

Friends of Kean arose during the 1985 election, in which the New
Jersey electorate would select a governor and all assembly seats. 90 New
Jersey had previously adopted a public financing scheme for its gubernatorial campaign with expenditure limits. 9 1 To ensure that these spending limits were followed, the legislature created the New Jersey Election
Law Enforcement Commission (NJELEC). 9 2 Concomitant with the gubernatorial race, however, were legislative races not publicly financed,
and thus not limited in the amounts which could be spent. 93 In such
races, independent advertising by legislative candidates often linked
their electoral efforts with that of their party's gubernatorial
94
candidate.
In Buckley and National Conservative PAC, the United States Supreme
Court held that limitations upon independent expenditures during campaigns by either individuals or PACs are violative of the constitutional
86. See id. §§ 19:44A-2, -7, -8.
87. See id. § 19:44A-27.
88. See id. §§ 19:44A-2, -3, -29.
89. 114 N.J. 33, 552 A.2d 612 (1989).
90. Id. at 36, 552 A.2d at 613. Thomas Kean, the incumbent Governor, was
heavily favored to win reelection, as his opponent, Peter Shapiro, a surprise winner of the Democratic primary, was not widely known throughout the state.
91. Id. at 35, 552 A.2d at 613. By accepting public funds, a gubernatorial
candidate limits the amount he or she may spend during the campaign. Id. For
a discussion of the New Jersey legislation regarding campaign financing, see
supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
92. Friends of Kean, 114 N.J. at 35, 552 A.2d at 613.
93. See Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-2 (West 1989). Although the New Jersey legislature had
originally imposed expenditure limits on all New Jersey elections, such limitations for non-publicly financed elections were repealed after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Buckley. Id. § 19:44A-3.
94. See Friends of Kean, 114 N.J. at 35, 552 A.2d at 613.
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guarantees of free speech and association.9" In Friends of Kean, the New
Jersey Supreme Court similarly stated that any application by NJELEC
of independent spending by an assembly candidate toward the expenditure limits of a publicly financed gubernatorial candidate infringed upon
constitutional guarantees. 9 6 Although holding that the legislature did
not grant the NJELEC the expressed or implied authority to allocate
such spending,9 7 the court explained that such authority, if granted,
would violate the first amendment in light of Buckley and National Conservative PAC.9 8

In a 1981 advisory opinion, NJELEC had stated that advertising expenditures by assembly candidates benefitting a gubernatorial candidate
would circumvent the expenditure limits of the gubernatorial race. 99
Therefore, any money spent by legislative candidates that assisted a gubernatorial candidate would be allocated by NJELEC to the gubernatorial candidate and applied to that candidate's expenditure limits, even
when the gubernatorial campaign had not authorized, or consented to,
the independent spending on its behalf. 0 0 In 1985, Governor Kean's
campaign and many Republican assembly candidates asked NJELEC to
95. For a discussion of Buckley and National Conservative PAC, see supra notes
42-69 & 73-81, respectively, and accompanying text.
96. Friends of Kean, 114 NJ. at 39-40, 552 A.2d at 615. The New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized that the facts in the case before it were perhaps distinguishable from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Buckley
and National Conservative PAC, yet the court concluded that the constitutional
concerns expressed therein similarly necessitated the invalidation of the proposed NJELEC rule. Id.
97. Id. at 39, 552 A.2d at 615. Because the legislature had not intended to
grant NJELEC this regulatory power, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
the agency could not promulgate a rule which would implement such a regulation in its overseeing of gubernatorial elections. See id. To imply such a power
in the authorizing statute would not effectuate the probable intent of the legislators, who themselves could be adversely affected in their own election strategies.
See id.
98. Id. at 39-40, 552 A.2d at 615.
99. Id. at 35-36, 552 A.2d at 613. The New Jersey Supreme Court described the content of the NJELEC advisory opinion as follows:
[NJ]ELEC decided to allocate to the gubernatorial candidate's expenditure limit a percentage of advertising expenditures made by a non-gubernatorial candidate of the same party that in certain ways mentioned
or advocated the election of the gubernatorial candidate.... [S]ums of
money spent by non-gubernatorial candidates-apparently even without a showing of prior knowledge, consent, authorization or control by
the gubernatorial candidates-would be allocated to the gubernatorial
candidates and charged against their expenditure limits as if the gubernatorial candidates spent the money themselves. The effect ...

would

be to reduce, by that amount, the sum permitted to be spent on the
gubernatorial candidate's own campaign.
Id.
100. Id. Although the advisory opinion was first issued in 1981 by NJELEC
and reaffirmed by the commission in 1985, no rule had been promulgated implementing this allocative power in NJELEC. See id. at 36, 37 n.1, 552 A.2d at
613, 614 n.l.
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reverse its 1981 advisory opinion, but NJELEC reaffirmed its prior decision.10 1 In response, the Kean campaign and the Republican candidates
filed suit challenging NJELEC's interpretation of its own authority in policing the expenditure limits.

10 2

On appeal from the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, the
New Jersey Supreme Court faced two primary issues. First, it addressed
whether NJELEC possessed the legislatively granted authority to allocate independent spending to the Kean campaign and apply it to the
10 3
expenditure limits set for the publicly financed gubernatorial race.
Second, assuming that such authority had been delegated to NJELEC,
the court then examined whether the proposed regulation would be violative of the constitutional rights of assembly candidates to free speech
10 4
and association.
The court held that the legislature did not intend to delegate such
allocative power to NJELEC when such independent spending was
10 5
neither coordinated nor authorized by the gubernatorial campaign.
101. Id. at 36, 552 A.2d at 613. With a popular Republican incumbent
seeking reelection, it was advantageous for Republican assembly candidates to
link their efforts with Kean's own at the top of the ticket.
102. Id. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey rejected NJELEC's interpretation of its authority, finding the allocation of independent expenditures by an assembly candidate on behalf of a gubernatorial
campaign was a violation of NJELEC's own regulations. Friends of Governor
Kean v. New Jersey Election Enforcement Comm'n, 203 N.J. Super. 523, 534,
497 A.2d 555, 561 (App. Div. 1985). The court stated that a NJELEC advisory
opinion could not override regulations already duly adopted. Id. The New
Jersey Administrative Code provides: "[I]ndependent expenditures shall not be
deemed to be expenditures within the meaning of NJ.S.A. 19:44A-7 [which sets

expenditure limits on the public findings of gubernatorial campaigns] ...... NJ.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 25-15.28 (1986).

Appealing to the New Jersey Supreme Court, NJELEC argued that the court
should decide the issue as if a regulation allowing allocative powers had been
adopted, thereby ascertaining whether the legislature had delegated to NJELEC
the power to allocate independent spending by an assembly candidate to a gubernatorial campaign's official spending total. Friends of Kean, 114 N.J. at 37 n.1,
552 A.2d at 614 n.1. The proposed regulation of NJELEC reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
[A]n expenditure on behalf of a gubernatorial candidate by another
candidate of the same party running in the same election shall be
deemed to be an expenditure within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 19:44A-7
[the section imposing campaign expenditure limits]. If the expenditure
is on behalf of both the candidate making the expenditure and the gubernatorial candidate, it shall be allocated ....
Id.

103. Friends of Kean, 114 N.J. at 36-37, 552 A.2d at 613.
104. Id. at 37, 552 A.2d at 613-14.
105. Id. at 39, 552 A.2d at 615. The court rejected NJELEC's argument
that the legislature intended to authorize regulatory powers over the independent spending of gubernatorial candidates which benefited a gubernatorial campaign in order to preserve the integrity of expenditure limits in publicly financed
elections. Id. at 38, 552 A.2d at 614. The court did note, however, that some
allocative power in NJELEC was authorized when the spending of assembly can-
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The court found no legislative intent to give NJELEC the power to allocate truly independent spending by assembly candidates to the gubernatorial campaign and to apply such spending to the campaign's
expenditure limits.' 0

6

It did recognize, however, that the legislature

created NJELEC to ascertain that mandated expenditure limits in the
publicly financed gubernatorial race were observed. 10 7 Such limits, the
court observed, could be evaded through coordinated strategies between assembly and gubernatorial candidates designed to disguise
spending by the gubernatorial campaign through the spending of assembly candidates who were not bound to any spending limits. 10 8 Without NJELEC policing the financing of gubernatorial campaigns, such
circumvention would defeat the purposes of expenditure limits. '0 9
While recognizing this legislative purpose, the court rejected the
argument that the allocative powers of NJELEC extended to the independent spending by assembly candidates on behalf of Governor
Kean when the Kean campaign had neither authorized nor consented to
the independent spending." 0 The court opined that the experience of
legislators would discourage this grant of allocative authority to
NJELEC."'1 Implicitly describing the long tradition of so-called "coattail" and "party line" appeals in campaigns, the court stated that legisla12
tors did not intend to prevent these appeals in their own campaigns."
didates was coordinated with, or authorized by, the gubernatorial candidate's
campaign. Id.
106. Id. at 38-39, 552 A.2d at 614-15.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 38, 552 A.2d at 614. Describing the legislature's intention when
it created NJELEC, the court stated:
[NJ]ELEC contends that the regulation allocating expenditures of
other candidates to the gubernatorial candidate is necessary to accomplish the legislative intent to limit gubernatorial campaign expenditures
....
[T]he Legislature must have intended [NJ]ELEC to have the
power to allocate some expenditures between or among candidates.
Otherwise, gubernatorial candidates might circumvent the expenditure
limit by conducting part of their campaigns through a non-limited candidate, thereby frustrating one of the purposes of the Act.
Id. (emphasis in original).
109. Id.
110. Id. The court stated: "[W]e cannot sanction [NJ]ELEC's course of action ....
We do not believe that a statutory policy authorizing [NJ]ELEC to
charge a truly independent and uncontrolled expenditure of another candidate
against a gubernatorial candidate's account would have been enacted by the
Legislature." Id. (emphasis in original).
111. Id. ("It is manifestly contrary to the expectations of legislators based
on their own experience and on strong political tradition in this State.").
112. Id. Describing the longstanding traditional campaign appeals in New
Jersey, the court elaborated:
When running for election in a year that features a gubernatorial
candidate race, candidates for the Legislature of this State almost invariably support that gubernatorial candidate in their speeches, their
brochures, their billboards, on radio and television, and in practically
every other kind of advertisement. Whether out of self-interest, mere
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If the power to allocate assembly candidate independent spending to the
Governor's campaign was intended to be wielded by NJELEC, then legislative candidates would have to refrain from party line appeals in their
own campaign ads or risk severely hampering the monies available to be
spent by the gubernatorial candidate. 1 13 Neither alternative, the court
explained, could realistically effectuate the legislature's intent. 1 14 To
accept the argument of NJELEC would imply an intent to the legislature
at odds with longstanding traditional electoral appeals and the political
environment in which state elections were held. 1 15
Moreover, it noted that even if such authorization had been intended by the legislature, such regulation would most likely violate the
constitutional rights of free speech and association of assembly candidates to independently choose how to spend their funds. 1 6 Noting the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Buckley and National
Conservative PAC, the court concluded that the proposed regulation
would likely violate the constitutional right of legislative candidates to
independently spend any amount on behalf of their supported candidate, even when the supported candidate's own expenditures are limited
by public financing restrictions. 1 17 The court found the proposed
habit, loyalty to the party, or political conviction, they all run, as a team,
alongside their party's gubernatorial candidate, as a group committed
to shared policies and to shared power.
Id.
Though traditional in campaigns, such "party line" and "coat-tail" appeals
have been less effective in recent elections. See W. CROTrY, supra note 24, at 21014, 224-26. For an analysis of the decline of party identification in the electorate
which has decreased the effectiveness of such appeals, see generally Burnham,
American Politics in the 1970s: Beyond Party?, in THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 308
(W. Chambers & W. Burnham eds. 2d ed. 1975).
113. Friends of Kean, 114 NJ. at 38-39, 552 A.2d at 614. The court, recognizing that such regulations would affect the manner in which the legislators
conducted their own campaigns, noted:
The legislators who voted for these laws not only know this tradition, they have actually been part of it. The idea that the advertisement
linking a legislator's campaign to the head of the ticket would reduce
the amount the gubernatorial candidate could spend would be regarded as an intolerable reading of the statute.
Id.
114. Id. at 39, 552 A.2d at 614-15. The court, noting the adverse effect
such a regulation would engender in the manner in which either gubernatorial
or assembly candidates would conduct their campaigns, concluded: "[I]f
[NJ]ELEC's allocation regulation were upheld, this public-spirited law designed
to finance the gubernatorial candidate's campaign could either cripple it or seriously alter the campaigns of legislative running-mates. The presumption of validity of the agency's allocation regulation dissolves when immersed in this
political environment." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 39-40, 552 A.2d at 615.
117. For a further discussion of the holdings and rationales of the Buckley
and National Conservative PAC decisions, see supra notes 42-69 & 73-81, respectively, and accompanying text.
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NJELEC rule similar to those statutes previously struck down by the
United States Supreme Court which attempted to restrict the amount an
individual or PAC could independently spend on behalf of their preferred candidate, even where the official expenditures of the candidate
were limited by the strictures of spending limits placed on publicly fi8
nanced campaigns. 1
In so holding, the court expressly stated that NJELEC could exercise allocative power, but circumscribed its use. Such power could be
wielded in cases where it was established that spending by legislative
candidates on behalf of a gubernatorial candidate was not truly independent, but rather authorized or consented to by the gubernatorial
campaign. 119 Such regulatory measures by NJELEC, the court concluded, would effectuate the intent of the legislature and pass constitutional muster in light of previous United States Supreme Court
0
decisions. 12

IV.

ANALYSIS

In Friends of Kean, the Supreme Court of New Jersey followed the
constitutional standards set by the United States Supreme Court in the
Buckley and National Conservative PAC decisions by finding any restriction
118. Friends of Kean, 114 N.J. at 40, 552 A.2d at 615. The court compared

previous United States Supreme Court decisions with the issue it faced:
Both holdings [in Buckley and National Conservative PAC] applied to independent expenditures made on behalf of any presidential candidate
whose campaign is publicly financed and whose expenditures are statutorily limited to the amount of such financing. Although distinguishable on various grounds, the reasoning and the facts of those cases
point strongly to the conclusion that the defacto restriction imposed by
[NJ] ELEC's allocation rule on truly independent expenditures by legislators to elect their gubernatorial candidate would be similarly suspect.
Id.
119. Id. at 39, 552 A.2d at 615 ("While [NJ]ELEC is free under the statute
to allocate expenses to a gubernatorial candidate who in fact controls another
candidate's expenditures, the agency cannot charge a gubernatorial candidate
with another candidate's truly independent expenditures.").
Two members of the court (Justices Handler and O'Hern), while concurring

in the judgment due to the need for a decision prior to election day, would not
have invalidated the regulation without a more detailed record to determine
whether such expenditures on behalf of the Governor were truly independent.
Id. at 40-41, 552 A.2d at 615.
120. Id. at 40, 552 A.2d at 615. Delineating the commission's proper authority, the court concluded:
[NJ]ELEC remains free to cope with subterfuge arising from joint funding of gubernatorial and legislative campaigns or similar concerted
campaigning. The clear avenue for regulatory action available to

[NJ]ELEC appears to be one directed at expenditures that are con-

sented to or authorized by the gubernatorial candidate or that candidate's committee or an umbrella organization. We do not believe that
there are serious constitutional questions that would arise from an appropriately drafted set of regulations along those lines.
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on independent spending to be an impermissible infringement on free
speech which could not be justified as a protection of a significant state
interest. 12 1 Through such decisions, the judiciary has created an opportunity for PACs and other monied parties, such as the assembly candidates in the New Jersey case, to defeat many of the primary purposes of
campaign reform legislation to the detriment of the electoral process as
a whole. This Note submits that both campaign expenditure and independent spending limitations serve legitimate governmental interests
which would justify the resulting infringement on free speech and association in their application. These governmental interests are: (1) the
interest in preserving electoral integrity; and (2) the interest in preserving an electoral system responsive to its constituents.
A.

The Governmental Interest in Preserving Electoral Integrity Through
Spending Limits

In light of the detrimental effects which unrestricted expenditures
have had on the entire electoral process, the contention that no significant governmental interest would be served by legislation limiting campaign expenditures and independent spending which would justify the
infringement of free speech and association rights is dubious and politically naive. In Buckley's wake, the influence of the electorate, as individual contributors with relatively equal voices fueling the electoral
process, has been stifled, while the power of well-organized, wealthy,
special interest PACs, which both donate and expend money to finance
campaigns or candidates, has grown predominant.' 2 2 As candidates and
incumbent officeholders grow increasingly dependent upon PAC campaign contributions and independent spending, it is not difficult to imagine that PAC campaign money buys PAC influence when candidates
become officeholders. Therefore, the conclusion that PAC money has
corrupted, or could potentially corrupt, the integrity of the electoral
process is plausible given the current electoral environment.12 3 Viewed
from this perspective, the preservation of electoral and governmental
121. For discussions of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Buckley and National Conservative PAC and their applicability to the New Jersey case,
see supra notes 42-69, 73-81, 118-20 and accompanying text.
122. For a description of the explosive growth in the number of PACs and
their increasing dominance in the financing of campaigns, see supra notes 64-68
and accompanying text. See also infra notes 123 & 139-44 and accompanying
text.
123. See W. CROTry, supra note 24, at 134. Crotty indicates that PAC donations to candidates usually go to those who eventually emerge victorious and
take office, which, in turn, results in political debts to repay to those who significantly assisted their effort. Id.; see also Ewing, supra note 3, at 396 (in 1982 elections, PACs provided winners with 35% of all money raised). PACs particularly
are eager to donate to federal incumbents, who are overwhelmingly reelected, in
order to retain their access to those in office. See Jacob, supra note 67, at 118-19
(80% of all PAC money went to federal incumbents in 1984).
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integrity would appear to be a primary governmental interest sufficient
to justify a limitation on independent and campaign expenditures.
The significant governmental interest of preserving electoral integrity was first used by the Court in Buckley to uphold the constitutional
validity of limitations on the amount which PACs or individuals could
contribute to a particular candidate and the total amount that an individual could contribute per year. 12 4 Notwithstanding the recognition of
such a significant governmental interest, the Court insisted upon distinguishing between campaign contributions to a candidate and expenditures made by, or independently for, a candidate. 125 Although the
essential purpose of each regulation was to preserve electoral integrity,
the Court maintained that to limit the former is constitutional, but to
limit the latter violates the first amendment because unlimited contributions pose a threat to electoral integrity but uncurbed spending does
not.

1 26

Perhaps such distinctions were valid for campaigns prior to the
1974 amendments and the Buckley decision. In pre-1974 campaigns, total spending in most campaigns, when compared to today's figures, was
reasonable. 127 Moreover, PACs were relative newcomers to the political
128
process with little influence, and independent spending was minimal.
Today's electoral landscape is vastly different. The cost of campaigns
has skyrocketed, and candidates are increasingly dependent upon both
PAC contributions and independent spending by PACs or other monied
individuals or groups to augment their own campaign efforts. Given
such a vastly altered electoral environment after Buckley, it can be asserted that: (1) limits on independent spending by PACs serve a significant governmental interest in preserving electoral integrity by reducing
the potential for political quid pro quos in exchange for such spending;
and (2) limits on total campaign spending serve a related governmental
interest by reducing the reliance of candidates on special interest PACs
to finance their costly campaigns, thereby reducing the potential for undue influence by such groups at the expense of the public interest.
1. Governmental Interest Served by Independent Spending Limits
The Court has claimed that independent expenditures by individu124. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's upholding of
federal contributory limits, see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
125. For an examination of the United States Supreme Court's invalidation
of federal limitations upon expenditures, see supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
126. For a delineation of the distinction between contributions and expenditures made by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley, see supra notes
48-60 and accompanying text.
127. See Green, The 'All Consuming' War Chest, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 17,
1989, at C2, col. 2.
128. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 387-88 (1971 Federal Election Campaign
Act legitimized role for PACs in electoral processes).
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als or PACs are likely to be ineffective and thus of no potential corruptive influence on the benefited candidate. 129 Given the exorbitant
amounts independently spent in the years after Buckley, such an assertion
has no basis in the reality of today's electoral environment. 130 Indeed,
common sense suggests that such large sums are spent because of their
potential effectiveness. Because candidates are increasingly relying on
independent spending to bolster their official efforts, the Court's depiction of independent spending as a virtually futile gesture with no potentially harmful effect on electoral integrity appears misguided.
In National Conservative PAC, the Court struck down limitations on
PAC independent expenditures, and Justice (presently Chief Justice)
Rehnquist minimized the potential for corruption in the absence of restrictions on independent spending. 13 1 Calling the threat to electoral
integrity "hypothetical," Justice Rehnquist implied that he would need
to be shown "precisely what the 'corruption' may consist of" before acknowledging such a threat.' 3 2 As an example of such a potential threat,
Justice Rehnquist described a scenario where "candidates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving
official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages;" as
long as such a threat remained only a hypothetical possibility, however,
he would not recognize the threat to electoral integrity and would invalidate independent spending restrictions which infringed on free speech
33
and association. '
Much like the Watergate scandal exposed the threat to electoral integrity when contributions were not regulated, so too the current Lincoln Savings & Loan scandal, allegedly involving a bank official and
several United States Senators, exposes the inherent threat of corruption and political quid pro quos when independent expenditures go unchecked. Charles Keating allegedly contributed sizeable amounts of
money both directly to candidates and indirectly through their various
state parties for the purported purpose of bankrolling a voter registration drive. 134 The bulk of such money was primarily donated to the par129. For a discussion of the Buckley decision's assertion that independent
expenditures in unlimited amounts do not pose a corruptive threat to the electoral process, see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. For an examination of
similar claims delineated in National Conservative PAC, see supra notes 74-81 and
accompanying text.
130. For an interesting analysis of the amounts and effectiveness of PAC
independent spending during the 1980 congressional elections, see Mann &
Ornstein, The Republican Surge in Congress, in THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS OF 1980
263 (A. Ranney ed. 1981).
131. National Conservative PAC, 490 U.S. at 496-97.
132. Id. at 497-98.
133. Id.
134. See Barnes, The Zillionaires Club, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1990, at
25. Such indirect sources of contributions remain largely unregulated at
present.
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ties of states which also happened to have incumbent Senators up for
reelection. As a result of such direct and indirect contributions, the Senators allegedly attempted to seek favors for Keating from federal administrative authorities.' 3 5 Although the Keating case did not directly
involve independent expenditures made on behalf of the Senators, it
clearly illustrates the inherent potential for corruption and quid pro
quos when large amounts of money may be spent indirectly on behalf of
candidates or officeholders.
Although the Keating case may not directly satisfy Justice Rehnquist's request to "precisely show what the 'corruption' consists of"
when independent expenditures remain unregulated, it does offer additional evidence that the threat to electoral integrity is both real and substantial when large amounts of money are available for candidates.
Thus, as the role of independent spending in campaigns continues to
grow, the concomitant threat to electoral integrity and potential for corruption also increases. Therefore, although a limitation on independent
spending may not have served a significant governmental interest at the
time of the Buckley decision, such a conclusion today, given the postBuckley evolution of the electoral system, is suspect.
In contrast, the limitation of independent spending by assembly
candidates, as seen in the Friends of Kean case, does not serve a substantial state interest, and, therefore, the decision in Friends of Kean is justified. Limiting independent spending by state legislative candidates will,
in most cases, only tangentially preserve electoral integrity while eliminating the benign traditional campaign appeals linking the assembly
candidate with the head of the ticket. 136 An assembly candidate's primary concern is in his own campaign, and any spending on behalf of
another candidate would likely be minimal and primarily designed to
further his own effort by inducing a party line appeal or coat-tail effect. 13 7 Thus, because no substantial state interest is served by such a
regulation, the regulation violates first amendment freedoms.138 Similar arguments, however, cannot be advanced by individuals or PACs in
support of their continued freedom to spend independently in campaigns. Far from being an established electoral tradition, independent
spending by PACs and individuals is a recent electoral phenomenon,
135. See Adams, Now it's Broken, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 1989, at 17;
see also Carlson, $1 Billion Worth of Influence, TIME, Nov. 6, 1989, at 27; Morganthau, S&L Scandal's Biggest Blowout, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1989, at 35.

136. For an examination of the New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusions
regarding the legislators' intent when they created NJELEC, see supra notes 10515 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of the electoral traditions of "party line" appeals and
"coat-tail" effect voting, see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
138. For a description of the effects which the allocation regulation of
NJELEC would impose on the state campaigns, see supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
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39
designed to circumvent the purposes of campaign finance reform law. 1

2.

Governmental Interest Served by Campaign Expenditure Limits

The Court stated in Buckley that a limitation on contributions is all
that is needed to preserve electoral integrity, and thus to regulate campaign expenditures would be an unnecessary infringement on free
speech and association. 1 40 Again, such a distinction was made by the
Court before the full effect of the 1974 amendments and the Buckley decision were discerned. The Court's distinction fails to consider both the
spiraling costs of campaign financing and the dominance of PACs to finance such inflating costs. As the role of the individual contributor-constituent in the financing process continues to diminish, the
corresponding potential for undue influence by special interest PACs
over candidates continues to grow.
The Buckley Court flatly rejected the contention that a reduction in
escalating campaign costs was a significant governmental interest which
justified first amendment infringement. 14 1 Yet, a limitation on campaign spending not only serves to level spending costs, but also seeks to
diminish the potential for undue influence which wealthy, well-organized, special interest PACs may assert by dominating the financing of
such increasingly expensive campaigns. The primary threat to governmental integrity is not the rising costs of campaigns, but rather the
growing reliance by candidates on special interest PACs to finance their
efforts in the wake of escalating campaign costs. The Court in Buckley
did not foresee the dependence by candidates on PACs for campaign
financing and thus failed to discern the potential for undue influence
which such a relationship may encourage at the expense of the general
public interest.14 2 Because a limitation on campaign expenditures
would alleviate the potential for undue influence on elected officials by
special interest PACs, a substantial governmental interest is served
which may override first amendment guarantees.
Consequently, because contributory regulations alone have not
protected the electoral process from corruption or the appearance of
corruption and the electoral landscape has drastically changed since the
Buckley decision, a limitation on both campaign and independent expenditures may be needed to protect the same interests which the permissible contributory limitations serve. 1 43 As candidates continue to
139. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 395-96. Ewing notes the proliferation of
PACs after reform measures were adopted and subsequently limited by the Buckley decision, allowing candidates to finance ever-escalating campaign costs; the
number of PACs has risen from 608 in 1974, to 1146 in 1976, to 2251 in 1980
and to 4576 in 1987. Id. at 395.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 55, 57.
See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
For an interesting analysis of the problems which arise in the regula-
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rely upon independent spending on their behalf and PAC contributions
to finance their campaigns, the potential threat of political quid pro
14 4
quos in exchange for such financing grows ever more apparent.
Thus, much like contribution limits, a limitation on all types of expenditures would serve the governmental interest of reducing the current potential for corruption present in election campaigns.
B.

The Governmental Interest In Preserving Accountability to Constituents

Although Buckley recognized that some of the expenditure limits
contained in the 1974 amendments were intended to serve the same
purposes as the valid contributory limits, the Court believed that the
governmental interest in preserving electoral integrity was not adequately advanced to justify the expenditure limits. 14 5 It also found that
such restrictions more directly infringed upon core first amendment
freedoms. 146 Thus, because the Buckley and NationalConservative PAC decisions could not discern any additional significant governmental interests served by the expenditure regulations to justify the greater
infringement on speech, both held such limitations impermissible. Even
if such a distinction between the degrees of speech infringement caused
by contributory and expenditure limitations is valid, this Note contends
that expenditure limits serve an additional governmental interest in preserving governmental and electoral accountability-an interest which
contributory limits alone have failed to preserve in the years following
Buckley.
Due to the invalidation of expenditure limits and the rise of PACs
and their considerably expanding resources, the cost of the campaigns
has continued to escalate. Spending, even in races limited by public financing, has dramatically increased as the influx of both PAC donations
and independent expenditures have exploded. The very purpose of
public financing-to set maximum spending caps in campaigns-is now
easily circumvented through independent spending by outsiders which
may not be applied to the statutory cap. 14 7 As a result, PACs now have
seized the dominating influence over the electoral process which reform
tion of PAC independent expenditures, see generally Letherberry, Rethinking
Regulation of Independent Expenditures by PACs, 35 CASE W. REs. 13 (1984).
144. See F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 322-25; see also W. CROTrY, supra note
24, at 134; Ewing, supra note 3, at 396; Jacob, supra note 67, at 118-19.
145. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 ("Assuming ... large independent expenditures pose the same dangers . . . [as] large contributions, [limiting independent
expenditures does] not provide an answer that sufficiently relates to the elimina-

tion of those dangers.").
146. See id. at 47-48 ("While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails
to serve any substantial governmental interest ... it heavily burdens core First
Amendment expression.").
147. For an examination of the growth in total campaign spending in the
aftermath of judicial frustration of campaign finance reform, see supra note 62
and accompanying text.
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had attempted to re-direct to individuals.' 4 8 If democratization of the
campaign finance process was a primary goal of Congress, the Court's
decisions have subverted this purpose. By voiding expenditure limitations, the Court has created an electoral process in which candidates are
more dependent upon outsiders for campaign financing than upon the
49
constituents whom they represent. 1
To attract both PAC contributions and independent spending on
their behalf to meet spiraling campaign costs, candidates increasingly
appeal to narrow, single-issue PACs. As a result, a candidate may channel his message within narrow confines to continue receiving PAC
sources of money for the campaign.' 50 Many federal incumbents now
finance their campaigns primarily through PAC donations and not
through money from the state or district which the officeholder represents.151 Thus, without spending limits, the concerns of individual constituents may grow increasingly irrelevant as candidates depend more
heavily on special interest PACs to finance their election campaigns. In
this manner, PAC dominance of the electoral process threatens to decrease the quality of representation by elected officials and to lessen
their accountability to constituents. 152 If spending could be controlled
148. For a discussion of the increasing propensity for candidates to finance
their campaigns through PAC contributions and independent spending rather
than individual contributors, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
149. For a description of the decreasing influence of individual contributors on the campaign financing process, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying
text. See generally Rich, Campaign Finance Legislation: Equality and Freedom, 20
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 409 (1986); Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence
Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985).
For an analysis of the developing relationships between PACs and candidates, especially those who are incumbent office holders, see supra notes 63-68,
122-23 & 139-44 and accompanying text.
150. See W. CRo-rY, supra note 24, at 133-34. Crotty explains some recent
attempts by PACs to flex their newly-found, and still growing, political muscle:
The decline of party influence in campaigns has paralleled the
surge in importance of the PACs. As the parties have become less cohesive, PACs have become aggressive in funding campaigns, requiring
prospective candidates to pledge support to issues critical to the PAC's
constituency (from abortion to curbs on foreign trade), and even supplying media consultants and campaign managers for candidates they
favor. In some cases, they have gone so far as to recruit their own candidates and then run their campaigns in primaries against the established party candidate, with whom they differed, or in general elections.
Id. at 134. For an examination of the relationship between political parties and
campaign finance reform, see generally Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign
FinanceLaws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (1987).
151. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 396 (noting more than one-half of incumbent House members receive at least one-half of their financing from PACs).
152. See W. CROTrv, supra note 24, at 138-41. To illustrate the effect that
PAC donations have upon candidates who are elected or already hold office,
Crotty examined the relationship between chemical industry PAC donations and
the votes of United States Senators who were the recipients of the chemical
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in the electoral arena, then the role of the individual contributor in the
campaign process may be preserved, thereby promoting accountability
by officeholders to their constituencies.
Expenditure limits would also preserve an essential role for political
parties in the electoral process. The rising influence of PACs in elec53
tions has largely been at the expense of party organizational vitality.1
Political parties play an important stabilizing role on the political process. Indeed, Justice Powell stated that political parties serve a "variety
of substantial governmental interests" which would "justify tangential
54
burdening of First Amendment rights."1
Moreover, independent spending by PACs or individuals also decentralizes the campaign process and reduces the accountability of a
candidate over actions done on his behalf by independent supporters. 15 5 A candidate may have no control over the words or conduct of
his independent supporters. Given the amounts now spent on independent expenditures, especially those spent on widely seen media
advertisements, such decentralization creates an electoral environment
more personally rancorous and thus less constructive and issue-oriented. In this manner, expenditure limits would serve a substantial interest in preserving the accountability of the candidate for the campaign
waged by his or her supporters.
V.

CONCLUSION

The goals of campaign finance reform-including lower election
costs, limitation and accountability in campaign contributions, candidate
expenditures and independent spending by individuals and PACs, and
an increase in influence of the electorate within the electoral process1 56 -have not been achieved, primarily due to constitutional restraints placed on such attempts by the judiciary. 15 7 Although the
PAC's largesse, on bills concerning environmental regulations. Id. at 138-39.
Crotty concluded that "[t]here is a strong association between the chemical industry's PAC giving and the position of senators in opposing increased funding
for and regulation of toxic waste dumping. Incumbent senators receiving the
most funds cast a total of 89 percent of their votes in favor of the chemical industry's position." Id. at 139.
153. See W. CRorr,, supra note 24, at 133-34. Crotty warns that while PACs
are increasingly absorbing the financial roles once played by parties, PACs do
not function, as parties had, as centralized structures which provide policy coherence and accountability. Id.
154. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
155. For an interesting analysis describing how PAC independent spending
against liberal incumbent Senators in 1980 nearly backfired due to excessive
mudslinging, but ultimately proved successful, see Mann & Ornstein, supra note
130, at 268-82.
156. For a discussion of the goals of financing reforms, see supra note 29

and accompanying text.
157. See Ewing, supra note 3, at 396 (asserting Supreme Court must assume
partial responsibility for distortion of congressional intent by creating present
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United States Supreme Court upheld a limitation on individual and PAC
contributions to particular candidates, it objected to measures limiting
campaign expenditures of non-publicly financed candidates and restrictions which limited the amount any individual or PAC could independently spend on behalf of favored candidates. As a result, the political
environment in which elections are held has been radically altered, and
campaign finance reform has been frustrated.
The judicial response to campaign finance reform has opened a
Pandora's box to a chaotic electoral process. The growing influence of
PACs and independent sources of spending will further escalate the
costs of campaigns and the potential for corruption, while actually decreasing the influence of, and accountability to, the public-at-large. Officeholders and candidates aim their appeals to PACs first, while
constituents' interests are deemphasized. Clearly, this end result was
not intended by the advocates of reform. Given the constitutional protection afforded expenditures by the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely
that any new finance reform law can right the unintended effects which
the judiciary has created. A limitation on total PAC contributions to
candidates could be circumvented easily through PAC independent expenditures. A similar result would follow if public financing of all elections was adopted. Thus, the increasing influence of PACs over an
incredibly expensive electoral process, barring any reversals of opinion
by the United States Supreme Court, will be a permanent fixture on the
electoral landscape for the foreseeable future.
John P. Monaghan
electoral influence of special interest PACs). For an examination of the judicial
reaction to federal campaign finance reform legislation, see supra notes 50-53,
55-56, 77-80 and accompanying text.
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